



NATIONAL SECURITY
RESEARCH DIVISION

LAURA H. BALDWIN, PH.D.
ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

4570 FIFTH AVENUE
SUITE 600
PITTSBURGH, PA
15213-2665

TEL 412.683.2300, EXT 4901
FAX 412.683.2800
lbaldwin@rand.org

August 22, 2018

Mr. Daniel Chykirda
Security Review Specialist
Department of Defense
Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review
1155 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1155

Ref: 18-S-0995

Dear Mr. Chykirda,

I am writing to appeal the decision to deny public release for RAND RR-1516-OSD, entitled "Throughput Based Analysis of Army Active/Reserve Component Mix for Major Contingency Surge Operations." Mr. Klippstein's objections noted that the analysis is based on unclassified data but has classified impacts on the Army's ability to meet contingency operations.

This analysis is based entirely on unclassified data and uses these unclassified data to highlight generalized shortfalls in planning and in potential execution. We have inquired through our Army contacts and are not aware of any official sources suggesting that identification of these types of generalized shortfalls rises to the level of specificity that would require limiting access to this information. In the absence of any such sources, we ask that this information be cleared for public release. Broad discussion of this type of independent assessment can help DoD better understand and gain support to address identified problems.

We look forward to hearing from you.

Thank you,

Laura H. Baldwin, Ph.D.
Associate Director
National Security Research Division
RAND
(412) 683-2300 x4901
(412) 908-0645 (cell)
lbaldwin@rand.org

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and Communities
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Education and Literacy
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OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS. EFFECTIVE SOLUTIONS.



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3/5/7
400 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0400

DAMO-SS

22 June 2018

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: RAND Report RR-1516-OSD Throughput Based Analysis of Active & Reserve Components for Major Contingency Ops

1. References.

- a. Army Regulation 5-21, Management RAND Arroyo Center, 25 May 2012.
- b. RAND Report RR-1516-OSD Throughput Based Analysis of Active & Reserve Components for Major Contingency
- c. Office of the Chief of Public Affairs (OCPA) Public Release Decision of RAND Report RR-1516-OSD (DD Form 1910 dated 20180531)

2. I non-concur with releasing RAND Report RR-1516-OSD to the public. I further recommend that positive control of this report be maintained within the Department of Defense and the RAND Corporation, and at a minimum it be marked confidential and treated as such. My assessment is that though this research was conducted using unclassified inputs, the conclusions and implications have classified impacts on the Army's ability to meet contingency operations.

3. For additional information, my point of contact is Mr. Walter "Tony" Vanderbeek, 703-614-6822, walter.a.vanderbeek.civ@mail.mil or Mr. Mark D. Calvo (DCS/G-3/5/7, DAMO-SSP); 703-692-8593; mark.d.calvo.ctr@mail.mil.

KLIPPSTEIN,DANIEL Digitally signed by
KLIPPSTEIN,DANIEL,MARK.1101174391
MARK.1101174391 Date: 2018.06.22 14:06:46 -04'00'

DANIEL M. KLIPPSTEIN, SES
Deputy Director, Strategy, Plans and Policy
U.S. Army



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE OFFICE OF PREPUBLICATION AND SECURITY REVIEW
1155 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1155

June 25, 2018
Ref: 18-S-0995

Ms. Linda Barron
RAND Corporation
1200 South Hayes Street
Arlington, VA 22202-5050

Dear Ms. Barron:

This is in response to your March 5, 2018, correspondence requesting public release approval of the RAND Report:

- *Throughput Based Analysis of Army Active/Reserve Component Mix for Major Contingency Surge Operations (RR-1516-OSD)*

The report is **not cleared** for public release. DoD has determined that information in the report is unsuitable for public release (see the enclosed memorandum).

You have the right to administratively appeal this response by submitting through this office to the appellate authority: Director of Administration, Office of the Chief Management Officer. The appeal must offer written justification to support reversal of each required amendment being appealed. Send the appeal postmarked within 60 days from the date of this response to the following address:

Department of Defense
Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review
1155 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1155

Please direct any questions regarding this case to Mr. Daniel Chykirda, Security Review Specialist, at 703-697-6763 or by email at daniel.j.chykirda.civ@mail.mil.

Sincerely,

Darrell W. Walker
Chief

Chykirda, Daniel J CIV WHS ESD (US)

From: Chykirda, Daniel J CIV WHS ESD (US)
Sent: Thursday, August 23, 2018 12:57 PM
To: Thomas, Lisa CIV USARMY HQDA OCPA (US)
Subject: FW: [Non-DoD Source] 18-S-0995 Appeal from RAND Corporation
Attachments: 18-S-0995_Appeal_DoD_Security_Review_RAND.PDF; 18-S-0995 Not Cleared.pdf; 18-S-0995 Appeal 373.pdf

Lisa,

RAND has appealed the denial in full Army G 3/5/7 gave them back in June, please have G 3/5/7 review the appeal letter and RAND's rationale for release and let me know if their position has changed or been modified. The appeal goes up to the Director, Administration in OSD/CMO so a memo stating their position would be best. Thanks!

v/r,

Dan

Daniel Chykirda
Security Review Specialist
Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review
Open: 703-697-6763
Secure: 912-0269
SIPR: Daniel.j.chykirda.civ@mail.smil.mil
JWICS: Daniel.chykirda@osdj.ic.gov
Comments - https://ice.disa.mil/index.cfm?fsa=card&sp=139133&s=110&dep=*DoD

-----Original Message-----

From: Baldwin, Laura [mailto:lbaldwin@rand.org]
Sent: Wednesday, August 22, 2018 12:20 PM
To: Chykirda, Daniel J CIV WHS ESD (US) <daniel.j.chykirda.civ@mail.mil>
Cc: Baldwin, Laura <lbaldwin@rand.org>
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] 18-S-0995 Appeal from RAND Corporation

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

Dear Mr. Chykirda,

Attached please find RAND's letter of appeal for the public release of RAND RR-1516-OSD, entitled "Throughput Based Analysis of Army Active/Reserve Component Mix for Major Contingency Surge Operations."

An original copy has also been mailed to you.

Please contact me should you need any further information.

Thank you.

Laura H. Baldwin, Ph.D.

Associate Director

National Security Research Division

RAND

(412) 683-2300 x4901

(412) 908-0645 (cell)

lbaldwin@rand.org



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE OFFICE OF PREPUBLICATION AND SECURITY REVIEW
1155 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1155

June 25, 2018
Ref: 18-S-0995

Ms. Linda Barron
RAND Corporation
1200 South Hayes Street
Arlington, VA 22202-5050

Dear Ms. Barron:

This is in response to your March 5, 2018, correspondence requesting public release approval of the RAND Report:

- *Throughput Based Analysis of Army Active/Reserve Component Mix for Major Contingency Surge Operations (RR-1516-OSD)*

The report is **not cleared** for public release. DoD has determined that information in the report is unsuitable for public release (see the enclosed memorandum).

You have the right to administratively appeal this response by submitting through this office to the appellate authority: Director of Administration, Office of the Chief Management Officer. The appeal must offer written justification to support reversal of each required amendment being appealed. Send the appeal postmarked within 60 days from the date of this response to the following address:

Department of Defense
Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review
1155 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1155

Please direct any questions regarding this case to Mr. Daniel Chykirda, Security Review Specialist, at 703-697-6763 or by email at daniel.j.chykirda.civ@mail.mil.

Sincerely,

Darrell W. Walker
Chief



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3/5/7
400 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0400

DAMO-SS

22 June 2018

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: RAND Report RR-1516-OSD Throughput Based Analysis of Active & Reserve Components for Major Contingency Ops

1. References.

- a. Army Regulation 5-21, Management RAND Arroyo Center, 25 May 2012.
- b. RAND Report RR-1516-OSD Throughput Based Analysis of Active & Reserve Components for Major Contingency
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3. For additional information, my point of contact is Mr. Walter "Tony" Vanderbeek, 703-614-6822, walter.a.vanderbeek.civ@mail.mil or Mr. Mark D. Calvo (DCS/G-3/5/7, DAMO-SSP); 703-692-8593; mark.d.calvo.ctr@mail.mil.

KLIPPSTEIN.DANIEL Digitally signed by
.MARK.1101174391

DANIEL M. KLIPPSTEIN, SES
Deputy Director, Strategy, Plans and Policy
U.S. Army

**Defense Office of Prepublication & Security
Review**

18-S-0995/1

Coordination Record

08/23/2018

SECURITY REVIEW

To: SECDEF >> ARMY -

Case Number: 18-S-0995/1

Type Of Document: PAPER

Pages: 89

Classification: Secret

Source: RAND - LINDA
BARRON

Event Date:

Purpose: PUBLIC RELEASE

Requester: Linck, Michael

Subject: THROUGHPUT BASED ANALYSIS OF ARMY ACTIVE COMPONENT RESERVE COMPONENT MIX FOR MAJOR
CONTINGENCY SURGE OPERATIONS

The attached material is forwarded for review in accordance with the following guidelines: Questions concerning this case should be directed to : DAN CHYKIRDA, Room: 2A534, 7036976763, Email: daniel.j.chykirda.civ@mail.mil, Unclassified Fax: .

Please advise if reviews required other than: ARMY

A reply is requested by: 09/14/2018

COORDINATION OFFICE ACTION

To: Defense Office of Prepublication & Security Review, DOPSR, Room , 2A534, 1155 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-1155

Review by this office in accordance with guidelines below, result in the following recommendation concerning clearance for publication.

Check One:

- ☐ No Objection as Received.
- ☐ Recommended Changes.
- ☐ No Objection Subject to Amendments made by this office (in black pencil). Amendments and rationale (security and policy) are annotated on page numbers listed below.
- ☐ Objection. Amendments to permit publication are impracticable. Reasons stated below.

(Continue on reverse side if necessary)

typed name, title, organization

phone number

date

signature

Instructions: It is the policy of the Department of Defense to authorize and encourage the public release of information concerning the Department of Defense consistent with security requirements, and other exemptions to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.

Security: Reviewing agencies should identify information known to be classified within the meaning of Executive Order 13526 (DoD Regulation 5200.1R) or information which in the judgement of the reviewing agency warrants classification. In the latter case, it is requested that reasons for this judgement be given and recommendations made for appropriate classification.

Policy: Material originated with the Department of Defense for public release should, in addition, be reviewed for conflict with established policies and programs of the Department of Defense or those of the national government. If change is necessary, reviewing agencies are requested to recommend acceptable substitute language where practicable, or specify needed change in sufficient detail to permit acceptable revision.

Editorial: Editorial review is not the responsibility of the Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review and reviewing agencies should not make editorial corrections. However, obvious errors of fact should be indicated.



NATIONAL SECURITY
RESEARCH DIVISION

LAURA H. BALDWIN, PH.D.
ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

4570 FIFTH AVENUE
SUITE 600
PITTSBURGH, PA
15213-2665

TEL 412.683.2300, EXT 4901
FAX 412.683.2800
lbaldwin@rand.org

August 22, 2018

Mr. Daniel Chykirda
Security Review Specialist
Department of Defense
Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review
1155 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1155

Ref: 18-S-0995

Dear Mr. Chykirda,

I am writing to appeal the decision to deny public release for RAND RR-1516-OSD, entitled "*Throughput Based Analysis of Army Active/Reserve Component Mix for Major Contingency Surge Operations*." Mr. Klippstein's objections noted that the analysis is based on unclassified data but has classified impacts on the Army's ability to meet contingency operations.

This analysis is based entirely on unclassified data and uses these unclassified data to highlight generalized shortfalls in planning and in potential execution. We have inquired through our Army contacts and are not aware of any official sources suggesting that identification of these types of generalized shortfalls rises to the level of specificity that would require limiting access to this information. In the absence of any such sources, we ask that this information be cleared for public release. Broad discussion of this type of independent assessment can help DoD better understand and gain support to address identified problems.

We look forward to hearing from you.

Thank you,

Laura H. Baldwin

Laura H. Baldwin, Ph.D.
Associate Director
National Security Research Division
RAND
(412) 683-2300 x4901
(412) 908-0645 (cell)
lbaldwin@rand.org

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OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS. EFFECTIVE SOLUTIONS.

Chykirda, Daniel J CIV WHS ESD (US)

From: Thomas, Lisa CIV USARMY HQDA OCPA (US)
Sent: Tuesday, April 9, 2019 6:59 AM
To: Chykirda, Daniel J CIV WHS ESD (US)
Subject: FW: Prepublication Security Review - RAND appeal
Attachments: Prepublication Security Review RAND AC_RC Throughput Analysis - 20190408.pdf

FYI

Vr,

Lisa Thomas
Office of the Chief of Public Affairs (OCPA)
Government Information Specialist
1500 Army Pentagon
Room 1E487
Office: (703) 693-6578
Email: lisa.thomas.civ@mail.mil
SIPR Email: lisa.thomas16.civ@mail.smil.mil

-----Original Message-----

From: Calvo, Mark D CTR USARMY HQDA (US) <mark.d.calvo.ctr@mail.mil>
Sent: Monday, April 8, 2019 4:00 PM
To: Burton, Tina M CIV (US) <tina.m.burton.civ@mail.mil>; Thomas, Lisa CIV USARMY HQDA OCPA (US) <lisa.thomas16.civ@mail.mil>
Cc: Vanderbeek, Walter A CIV USARMY HQDA DCS G-3-5-7 (US) <walter.a.vanderbeek.civ@mail.mil>; Cooke, Thomas M (Tom) CIV USARMY HQDA DCS G-3-5-7 (US) <thomas.m.cooke6.civ@mail.mil>; Sleeper, Sally <sleeper@rand.org>
Subject: RE: Prepublication Security Review - RAND appeal

Ms. Burton and Ms. Thomas,

DAMO-SS re-evaluation attached.

VR,
Mark

Mark D. Calvo
G-357 Army Studies Coordinator - CTR
HQDA G-3/5/7, DAMO-SSP
400 Army Pentagon (Rm 2D337)
Washington, D.C. 20310-0400

W: 703-692-8593

-----Original Message-----

From: Burton, Tina M CIV (US) <tina.m.burton.civ@mail.mil>

Sent: Thursday, April 4, 2019 5:22 PM

To: Vanderbeek, Walter A CIV USARMY HQDA DCS G-3-5-7 (US) <walter.a.vanderbeek.civ@mail.mil>

Cc: Cooke, Thomas M (Tom) CIV USARMY HQDA DCS G-3-5-7 (US) <thomas.m.cooke6.civ@mail.mil>; Thomas, Lisa CIV USARMY HQDA OCPA (US) <lisa.thomas16.civ@mail.mil>

Subject: FW: Prepublication Security Review - RAND appeal

Mr. Vanderbeek,

See message from Ms. Thomas. If you have memo signed by Mr. Cooke, please provide it to Ms. Thomas and I right away.

Vr,
Tina

-----Original Message-----

From: Thomas, Lisa CIV USARMY HQDA OCPA (US) <lisa.thomas16.civ@mail.mil>

Sent: Thursday, April 4, 2019 9:20 AM

To: Burton, Tina M CIV (US) <tina.m.burton.civ@mail.mil>

Subject: RE: Prepublication Security Review - RAND appeal

Good morning Tina,

The OSD Personnel and Readiness folks want to contact Mr. Thomas Cooke directly to get some movement on this case. They are upset that it is taking so long.

V/r,

Lisa Thomas
Office of the Chief of Public Affairs (OCPA)
Government Information Specialist
1500 Army Pentagon
Room 1E487
Office: (703) 693-6578
Email: lisa.thomas.civ@mail.mil
SIPR Email: lisa.thomas16.civ@mail.smil.mil

-----Original Message-----

From: Burton, Tina M CIV (US) <tina.m.burton.civ@mail.mil>

Sent: Tuesday, April 2, 2019 3:41 PM

To: Thomas, Lisa CIV USARMY HQDA OCPA (US) <lisa.thomas16.civ@mail.mil>

Subject: RE: Prepublication Security Review - RAND appeal

Lisa,

I spoke with Mr. Vanderbeek today, and he said that he would check to see if Mr. Cook, their Deputy who replaced Mr. Klippstein, had signed off on the memo yet and will let me know.

Vr,
Tina

-----Original Message-----

From: Thomas, Lisa CIV USARMY HQDA OCPA (US) <lisa.thomas16.civ@mail.mil>
Sent: Tuesday, April 2, 2019 2:54 PM
To: Burton, Tina M CIV (US) <tina.m.burton.civ@mail.mil>
Subject: RE: Prepublication Security Review - RAND appeal

Hi Tina,

I guess you have not received a response yet.

V/r,

Lisa Thomas
Office of the Chief of Public Affairs (OCPA)
Government Information Specialist
1500 Army Pentagon
Room 1E487
Office: (703) 693-6578
Email: lisa.thomas.civ@mail.mil
SIPR Email: lisa.thomas16.civ@mail.mil

-----Original Message-----

From: Burton, Tina M CIV (US) <tina.m.burton.civ@mail.mil>
Sent: Wednesday, March 27, 2019 10:03 AM
To: Vanderbeek, Walter A CIV USARMY HQDA DCS G-3-5-7 (US) <walter.a.vanderbeek.civ@mail.mil>
Cc: Thomas, Lisa CIV USARMY HQDA OCPA (US) <lisa.thomas16.civ@mail.mil>
Subject: FW: Prepublication Security Review - RAND appeal

Mr. Vanderbeek,

Were you able to complete another memo signed by Mr. Cooke for either your concurrence or continued non-concurrence of respective document for public release?

Vr,
Tina M. Burton
Program Manager
HQDA DCS G-3/5/7
Administration and Resources Directorate
400 Army Pentagon, Room 3D572
Washington, DC 20310-0400
Ofc Telephone: 703-614-9484
Ofc Email: tina.m.burton.civ@mail.mil

-----Original Message-----

From: Burton, Tina M CIV (US)
Sent: Wednesday, March 20, 2019 1:56 PM
To: Vanderbeek, Walter A CIV USARMY HQDA DCS G-3-5-7 (US) <walter.a.vanderbeek.civ@mail.mil>
Cc: Smith, Gloria A CIV USARMY HQDA DCS G-3-5-7 (US) <gloria.a.smith12.civ@mail.mil>
Subject: FW: Prepublication Security Review - RAND appeal

Mr. Vanderbeek,

Ms. Lisa Thomas from the Office of Public Affairs received an appeal for public release of RAND RR-1516-OSD, entitled "Throughput Based Analysis of Army Active/Reserve Component Mix for Major Contingency Surge Operations."

We need to provide Ms. Thomas another signed memorandum by your Civilian Deputy for continuation of either concurrence or continued non-concurrence of this document for public release. If you have any questions, please let me know.

Vr,
Tina M. Burton
Program Manager
HQDA DCS G-3/5/7
Administration and Resources Directorate
400 Army Pentagon, Room 3D572
Washington, DC 20310-0400
Ofc Telephone: 703-614-9484
Ofc Email: tina.m.burton.civ@mail.mil

-----Original Message-----

From: Thomas, Lisa CIV USARMY HQDA OCPA (US) <lisa.thomas16.civ@mail.mil>
Sent: Tuesday, March 19, 2019 2:14 PM
To: Burton, Tina M CIV (US) <tina.m.burton.civ@mail.mil>
Cc: Smith, Gloria A CIV USARMY HQDA DCS G-3-5-7 (US) <gloria.a.smith12.civ@mail.mil>
Subject: Prepublication Security Review - RAND appeal

Ms. Burton,

G-3/5/7 denied in full the release the RAND report in June. RAND appealed in August 2018. RAND's rationale for release is attached. The question is whether G-3/5/7 changed its position or modified.

If you could find out the status of this one, it would be great.

V/r,

Lisa Thomas
Office of the Chief of Public Affairs (OCPA)
Government Information Specialist
1500 Army Pentagon
Room 1E487
Office: (703) 693-6578
Email: lisa.thomas.civ@mail.mil
SIPR Email: lisa.thomas16.civ@mail.mil

(UNCLASSIFIED)

ARMY STAFFING FORM For use of this form, see DA Memo 25-52, the proponent agency is AASA.		1. TRACKING NUMBER N/A	2. TODAY'S DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20190405	3. SUSPENSE DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20190506																											
4. LEAD STAFF AGENCY G-3/5/7		5. SUBJECT Prepublication & Security Review of RAND's "A Throughput-Based Analysis of Army AC/RC Mix for Major Contingency Surge Operations																													
6. ROUTING: (ECC USE ONLY) Initial Date		ECC POC (Initial) ECC (Rank, Name, Phone No.) DIR, ECC (Initial)																													
<table border="1"><tr><td>SA</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>CSA</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>USA</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>VCSA</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>AASA</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>DAS</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>SMA</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>DUSA</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>VDAS</td><td></td><td></td></tr></table>		SA			CSA			USA			VCSA			AASA			DAS			SMA			DUSA			VDAS			COMMENTS:		
SA																															
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SMA																															
DUSA																															
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7. ORIGIN: Requirement from - <input type="checkbox"/> SA <input type="checkbox"/> CSA <input type="checkbox"/> USA <input type="checkbox"/> VCSA <input type="checkbox"/> Staff Initiated <input type="checkbox"/> OSD <input type="checkbox"/> Congress <input type="checkbox"/> CJCS/JS <input type="checkbox"/> Other Meeting/Forum/Other: E-mail Request from OCPA																															
8. WHAT IS IN THE THE PACKET? TAB A: SD Form 373 (For signature) TAB B: Previous SS Response TAB C: RAND Report																															
9. ACTION SEEKS SENIOR LEADER <input type="checkbox"/> Signature <input type="checkbox"/> Approval <input type="checkbox"/> Guidance <input type="checkbox"/> Information Only <input type="checkbox"/> Other Recommendation to senior leader:																															
10. KEY AREAS IMPACTED: <input type="checkbox"/> Funding <input type="checkbox"/> Equipment <input type="checkbox"/> Personnel <input type="checkbox"/> Training <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Strategy <input type="checkbox"/> Policy <input type="checkbox"/> Congressional <input type="checkbox"/> Legal <input type="checkbox"/> Other																															
11. KEY POINT(S) THE SENIOR LEADERS SHOULD GET FROM THIS ACTION: ■ OCPA, and RAND are requesting a re-evaluation of the subject report based upon an initial finding that it contains classified information in the conclusions section (pgs 42-48). ■ After a second review in SSP, we believe the report contains no classified information.																															
12. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: 1.) Background: The report was initially produced by RAND in 2017 and sponsored by OSD (ASD M&RA). 2.) The sponsoring agency cleared the report for publication in 2018. 3.) As part of the OCPA-directed pre-publication review, the Army (DAMO-SS) was tasked to review the report for security reasons. At that time the Deputy Director determined that some of the report conclusions and recommendations addressed sensitive information at the FOUO level. 4.) RAND, OSD, and OCPA disagree and requested a reevaluation by the Army (DAMO-SS) as that Service filed the only objection in the review process. 5.) After a second review in SSP, recommends that the report be cleared for release and publication as received.																															
13. SENIOR LEADER/DECISION/COMMENTS: APPROVED _____ DISAPPROVED _____ NOTED _____ SEE ME _____ COMMENT _____																															

HQDA FORM 5, AUG 2017

(UNCLASSIFIED)

PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE OBSOLETE. Page 1 of 3
APD LC v1.00ES

Defense Office of Prepublication & Security
Review

18-S-0995/1

Coordination Record

08/23/2018

SECURITY REVIEW

To: SECDEF >> ARMY -

Case Number: 18-S-0995/1

Type Of Document: PAPER

Pages: 89

Classification: Secret

Source: RAND - LINDA
BARRON

Event Date:

Purpose: PUBLIC RELEASE

Requester: Linck, Michael

Subject: THROUGHPUT BASED ANALYSIS OF ARMY ACTIVE COMPONENT RESERVE COMPONENT MIX FOR MAJOR
CONTINGENCY SURGE OPERATIONS

The attached material is forwarded for review in accordance with the following guidelines. Questions concerning this case should be directed to : DAN
CHYKIRDA, Room: 2A534, 7036976763, Email: daniel.j.chykirda.civ@mail.mil, Unclassified Fax:

Please advise if reviews required other than: ARMY

A reply is requested by: 08/14/2018

COORDINATION OFFICE ACTION

To: Defense Office of Prepublication & Security Review, DOPSR, Room: 2A534, 1155 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-1155

Review by this office in accordance with guidelines below, result in the following recommendation concerning clearance for publication.

Check One:



No Objection as Received.



Recommended Changes.



No Objection Subject to Amendments made by this office (in black pencil). Amendments and rationale (security and policy) are
annotated on page numbers listed below.



Objection. Amendments to permit publication are impracticable. Reasons stated below.

(Continue on reverse side if necessary)

MR THOMAS M. LOORE

(703) 614-2670

5 APR 2019



typed name, title, organization

phone number

date

signature

Instructions:

It is the policy of the Department of Defense to authorize and encourage the public release of information concerning the
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is requested that reasons for this judgement be given and recommendations made for appropriate classification.

Policy:

Material originated with the Department of Defense for public release should, in addition, be reviewed for conflict with established
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agencies are requested to recommend acceptable substitute language where practicable, or specify needed change in sufficient
detail to permit acceptable revision.

Editorial:

Editorial review is not the responsibility of the Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review and reviewing agencies
should not make editorial corrections. However, obvious errors of fact should be indicated.

Chykirda, Daniel J CIV WHS ESD (US)

From: Baldwin, Laura <lbaldwin@rand.org>
Sent: Tuesday, April 9, 2019 2:36 PM
To: Chykirda, Daniel J CIV WHS ESD (US)
Cc: Ledwich, Peter J IV CTR (USA); Hessel, Thomas J CIV OSD OUSD P-R (USA); Morse, Cameron R CIV WHS ESD (US); Sturgis, George R (Frosty) JR CIV WHS ESD (USA); Baldwin, Laura
Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] RE: RAND "Throughput" report

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

Dan,

I bet you can hear the shouts of joy from both RAND's Pittsburgh and Washington offices! Thanks so much for the good news and your and others' efforts behind the scenes to move this through the process.

Laura

-----Original Message-----

From: Chykirda, Daniel J CIV WHS ESD (US) <daniel.j.chykirda.civ@mail.mil>
Sent: Tuesday, April 9, 2019 2:27 PM
To: Baldwin, Laura <lbaldwin@rand.org>
Cc: Ledwich, Pete <pledwich@rand.org>; Hessel, Thomas J CIV OSD OUSD P-R (USA) <thomas.j.hessel.civ@mail.mil>; Morse, Cameron R CIV WHS ESD (US) <cameron.r.morse.civ@mail.mil>; Sturgis, George R (Frosty) JR CIV WHS ESD (USA) <george.r.sturgis.civ@mail.mil>
Subject: [EXT] RE: [Non-DoD Source] RE: RAND "Throughput" report

Laura,

Attached is DoD's appeal response to this case, the Army fell off their initial objections and now concurs with public release. If you have any questions please let me know.

v/r,

Dan

Daniel Chykirda
Security Review Specialist
Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review
Open: 703-697-6763
Secure: 912-0269
SIPR: Daniel.j.chykirda.civ@mail.mil
JWICS: Daniel.chykirda@osdj.ic.gov

Comments - Caution-https://ice.disa.mil/index.cfm?fsa=card&sp=139133&s=110&dep=*DoD

-----Original Message-----

From: Baldwin, Laura <lbaldwin@rand.org>

Sent: Thursday, April 4, 2019 8:54 AM

To: Chykirda, Daniel J CIV WHS ESD (US) <daniel.j.chykirda.civ@mail.mil>

Cc: Ledwich, Peter J IV CTR (USA) <pledwich@rand.org>; Hessel, Thomas J CIV OSD OUSD P-R (USA)

<thomas.j.hessel.civ@mail.mil>; Morse, Cameron R CIV WHS ESD (US) <cameron.r.morse.civ@mail.mil>; Baldwin, Laura <lbaldwin@rand.org>

Subject: [Non-DoD Source] RE: RAND "Throughput" report

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

Dan,

This is encouraging. Thanks to all for helping us get this moving toward resolution.

Laura

-----Original Message-----

From: Chykirda, Daniel J CIV WHS ESD (US) <daniel.j.chykirda.civ@mail.mil>

Sent: Thursday, April 4, 2019 8:43 AM

To: Baldwin, Laura <lbaldwin@rand.org>

Cc: Ledwich, Pete <pledwich@rand.org>; Hessel, Thomas J CIV OSD OUSD P-R (USA) <thomas.j.hessel.civ@mail.mil>;

Morse, Cameron R CIV WHS ESD (US) <cameron.r.morse.civ@mail.mil>

Subject: [EXT] RE: RAND "Throughput" report

Laura,

I talked to Army and they discussed this with G 3-5-7 yesterday. The person who made the OCA determination has left and the action is with his replacement for signature. I don't know have an estimate completion date at this time.

v/r,

Dan

Daniel Chykirda

Security Review Specialist

Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review

Open: 703-697-6763

Secure: 912-0269

SIPR: Daniel.j.chykirda.civ@mail.smil.mil

JWICS: Daniel.chykirda@osdj.ic.gov

Comments - Caution-https://ice.disa.mil/index.cfm?fsa=card&sp=139133&s=110&dep=*DoD

-----Original Message-----

From: Baldwin, Laura <lbaldwin@rand.org>
Sent: Wednesday, April 3, 2019 12:00 PM
To: Chykirda, Daniel J CIV WHS ESD (US) <daniel.j.chykirda.civ@mail.mil>
Cc: Ledwich, Peter J IV CTR (USA) <pledwich@rand.org>; Hessel, Thomas J CIV OSD OUSD P-R (USA) <thomas.j.hessel.civ@mail.mil>; Morse, Cameron R CIV WHS ESD (US) <cameron.r.morse.civ@mail.mil>; Baldwin, Laura <lbaldwin@rand.org>
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] RAND "Throughput" report

Dan,

We met with Thomas Hessel, our main POC in P&R, today, and one of the topics for discussion was reports in security review. He was particularly interested in the "Throughput" report by Mike Linick that is in the appeals process. I gave him the latest information from our last discussion, and I've ccd him here in hopes there may be additional information.

Thanks for your continued efforts to try to get to resolution.

Laura

Laura H. Baldwin, Ph.D.
Associate Director
National Security Research Division
RAND
(412) 683-2300 x4901
(412) 908-0645 (cell)
lbaldwin@rand.org

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Chykirda, Daniel J CIV WHS ESD (US)

From: Chykirda, Daniel J CIV WHS ESD (US)
Sent: Monday, February 11, 2019 10:03 AM
To: Thomas, Lisa CIV USARMY HQDA OCPA (US)
Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] RE: RAND question
Signed By: Daniel.J.Chykirda.civ@mail.mil

Might have to walk down and knock on the door, as ridiculous as that is.

-----Original Message-----

From: Thomas, Lisa CIV USARMY HQDA OCPA (US) <lisa.thomas16.civ@mail.mil>
Sent: Monday, February 11, 2019 9:54 AM
To: Chykirda, Daniel J CIV WHS ESD (US) <daniel.j.chykirda.civ@mail.mil>
Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] RE: RAND question

Daniel,

G-3/5/7 is not responding to email or messages.

v/r,

Lisa

-----Original Message-----

From: Chykirda, Daniel J CIV WHS ESD (US) <daniel.j.chykirda.civ@mail.mil>
Sent: Monday, February 11, 2019 9:52 AM
To: Thomas, Lisa CIV USARMY HQDA OCPA (US) <lisa.thomas16.civ@mail.mil>
Subject: FW: [Non-DoD Source] RE: RAND question

Lisa,

RAND really wants this appeal back. Has G 3/5/7 said anything since I asked you last week?

v/r,

Dan

-----Original Message-----

From: Baldwin, Laura <lbaldwin@rand.org>
Sent: Friday, February 8, 2019 4:33 PM
To: Morse, Cameron R CIV WHS ESD (US) <cameron.r.morse.civ@mail.mil>; Chykirda, Daniel J CIV WHS ESD (US) <daniel.j.chykirda.civ@mail.mil>
Cc: Ledwich, Pete <pledwich@rand.org>; Sturgis, George R (Frosty) JR CIV WHS ESD (USA) <george.r.sturgis.civ@mail.mil>; Baldwin, Laura <lbaldwin@rand.org>
Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] RE: RAND question

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

Cameron,

I'm following up on our recent discussion and hoping for an update on the following three items:

- * The "Throughput" report by Mike Linick that the Army denied public release without providing details of why the information is restricted (attached -- I gave you a copy of our appeal letter sent via hard copy August 22, 2018). We are unable to find any guidance that indicates the information could not be publicly released. If there is a problem, we'd like to know how to address it, not only for this document but for the future.
- * The OGC comments on Andrew Morral's report on a measure of sexual harassment risk. As we discussed before, their comments are not related to classification issues. Which comments are required to be addressed for public release?
- * The report by Chris Chivvis on Russian operations in Syria that has been in review since Nov 2017 and is in OSD Policy. Is there a timeline for their feedback?

Thanks so much for your help.

Laura

-----Original Message-----

From: Baldwin, Laura

Sent: Thursday, January 24, 2019 4:27 PM

To: Morse, Cameron R CIV WHS ESD (US) <cameron.r.morse.civ@mail.mil>; Chykirda, Daniel J CIV WHS ESD (US) <daniel.j.chykirda.civ@mail.mil>

Cc: Ledwich, Pete <pledwich@rand.org>; Sturgis, George R (Frosty) JR CIV WHS ESD (USA) <george.r.sturgis.civ@mail.mil>; Baldwin, Laura <lbaldwin@rand.org>

Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] RE: RAND question

Cameron,

Thanks for the helpful discussion with you and Frosty last week. You probably already have a copy of the attached, but here is a soft copy of the OGC comments on the document we discussed. We'll look forward to specific instructions on what text needs to be removed or changed for public release. I also have a note on my calendar to follow up with you next week about any remaining items.

Thanks,
Laura

-----Original Message-----

From: Morse, Cameron R CIV WHS ESD (US) <cameron.r.morse.civ@mail.mil>

Sent: Tuesday, January 15, 2019 8:04 AM

To: Baldwin, Laura <lbaldwin@rand.org>; Chykirda, Daniel J CIV WHS ESD (US) <daniel.j.chykirda.civ@mail.mil>

Cc: Ledwich, Pete <pledwich@rand.org>; Sturgis, George R (Frosty) JR CIV WHS ESD (USA) <george.r.sturgis.civ@mail.mil>

Subject: [EXT] RE: [Non-DoD Source] RE: RAND question

Laura,

We are still in 2A534. We have had a training requirement come up that morning that has the whole office attending until 1000. Will you be able to shift the meeting until a few minutes after 1000? We are still interested in getting together, we just need a little flexibility. Thanks!

v/r,

Cameron R. G. Morse
Policy Team Lead
Defense Office of Prepublication
and Security Review
1155 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1155
703-614-4928 (unsecure)

How are we doing?

** Comments - Caution-https://protect2.fireeye.com/url?k=c3284050-9f3116c3-c3286e07-0cc47a335a36-d96345ff729fca30&u=Caution-https://ice.disa.mil/index.cfm?fsa=card&sp=139133&s=110&dep=*DoD **

-----Original Message-----

From: Baldwin, Laura [Caution-mailto:lbaldwin@rand.org]
Sent: Thursday, January 10, 2019 5:34 PM
To: Chykirda, Daniel J CIV WHS ESD (US) <daniel.j.chykirda.civ@mail.mil>
Cc: Ledwich, Pete <pledwich@rand.org>; Morse, Cameron R CIV WHS ESD (US) <cameron.r.morse.civ@mail.mil>; Sturgis, George R (Frosty) JR CIV WHS ESD (USA) <george.r.sturgis.civ@mail.mil>; Baldwin, Laura <lbaldwin@rand.org>
Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] RE: RAND question

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

Daniel,

Thanks for the offer to meet. We'd appreciate the opportunity to discuss this a bit more and to meet Mr. Sturgis. 9am Wednesday sounds great. Are you still in 2A534?

Thanks,
Laura

-----Original Message-----

From: Chykirda, Daniel J CIV WHS ESD (US) <daniel.j.chykirda.civ@mail.mil>
Sent: Wednesday, January 9, 2019 3:22 PM
To: Baldwin, Laura <lbaldwin@rand.org>

Cc: Ledwich, Pete <pledwich@rand.org>; Morse, Cameron R CIV WHS ESD (US) <cameron.r.morse.civ@mail.mil>;
Sturgis, George R (Frosty) JR CIV WHS ESD (USA) <george.r.sturgis.civ@mail.mil>
Subject: [EXT] RE: [Non-DoD Source] RE: RAND question

Laura,

Even if this solves your issue would you still like to meet next Wednesday? Darrell Walker retired at the end of 2018 so DOPSR has a new Chief, George "Frosty" Sturgis Jr., and I think a meet and greet would be beneficial. Does Wednesday the 16th at 9am work for you?

v/r,

Dan

Daniel Chykirda
Security Review Specialist
Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review
Open: 703-697-6763
Secure: 912-0269
SIPR: Daniel.j.chykirda.civ@mail.smil.mil
JWICS: Daniel.chykirda@osdj.ic.gov
Comments - Caution-Caution-https://protect2.fireeye.com/url?k=fc29a103-a030f790-fc298f54-0cc47a335a36-57a0f8258b314f91&u=Caution-https://ice.disa.mil/index.cfm?fsa=card&sp=139133&s=110&dep=*DoD

-----Original Message-----

From: Chykirda, Daniel J CIV WHS ESD (US)
Sent: Wednesday, January 9, 2019 3:10 PM
To: 'Baldwin, Laura' <lbaldwin@rand.org>
Cc: Ledwich, Pete <pledwich@rand.org>; Morse, Cameron R CIV WHS ESD (US) <cameron.r.morse.civ@mail.mil>
Subject: RE: [Non-DoD Source] RE: RAND question

Laura,

Attached is the OGC review, this was sent to Mr. Morral directly at the conclusion of the review. I didn't provide a redacted copy since the amendments were not classified, the issues were legal or policy based. If you require anything else please let me know.

v/r,

Dan

Daniel Chykirda
Security Review Specialist
Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review
Open: 703-697-6763
Secure: 912-0269
SIPR: Daniel.j.chykirda.civ@mail.smil.mil
JWICS: Daniel.chykirda@osdj.ic.gov
Comments - Caution-Caution-https://protect2.fireeye.com/url?k=e2436845-be5a3ed6-e2434612-0cc47a335a36-338ba34e02ef2d88&u=Caution-https://ice.disa.mil/index.cfm?fsa=card&sp=139133&s=110&dep=*DoD

-----Original Message-----

From: Baldwin, Laura [Caution-Caution-mailto:lbaldwin@rand.org]
Sent: Wednesday, January 9, 2019 2:38 PM
To: Chykirda, Daniel J CIV WHS ESD (US) <daniel.j.chykirda.civ@mail.mil>
Cc: Ledwich, Pete <pledwich@rand.org>; Morse, Cameron R CIV WHS ESD (US) <cameron.r.morse.civ@mail.mil>;
Baldwin, Laura <lbaldwin@rand.org>
Subject: [Non-DoD Source] RE: RAND question

All active links contained in this email were disabled. Please verify the identity of the sender, and confirm the authenticity of all links contained within the message prior to copying and pasting the address to a Web browser.

Daniel,

I'm just following up on the document noted below and attached. Would it be possible to meet briefly next week? Pete Ledwich and I will be in Washington for other meetings and are free before 11am Wednesday morning. Would that work? If not, is there a better time Thursday? I'm not sure about our schedule, but we could try to accommodate that.

Thanks in advance,
Laura

-----Original Message-----

From: Baldwin, Laura
Sent: Monday, December 17, 2018 2:40 PM
To: Chykirda, Daniel J CIV WHS ESD (US) (daniel.j.chykirda.civ@mail.mil) <daniel.j.chykirda.civ@mail.mil>
Cc: Ledwich, Pete <pledwich@rand.org>; Baldwin, Laura <lbaldwin@rand.org>
Subject: RAND question

Daniel,

Pete Ledwich now oversees the document public release process for us since Linda Barron retired. Pete has been cleaning our files and found the attached report that was cleared as amended, but we cannot find a copy of the pages with blacked out text that need to be addressed for public release. Apologies that there has been quite a bit of time since this came from you, but we're hoping you still have the amended pages.

Thank you in advance for your help. And I hope you have a wonderful holiday!

Laura

On 3/9/18, 3:54 PM, "Chykirda, Daniel J CIV WHS ESD (US)" <daniel.j.chykirda.civ@mail.mil> wrote:

Good Afternoon,

Attached is the cleared as amended 1910 and title page, since you already have the P&R comments and OGC's amendments I won't fill your inbox unnecessarily. Did you ever hear back from Maria on the case RAND rewrote? Once I get her ok I can get that back to you as well.

v/r,

Dan

Daniel Chykirda
Security Review Specialist
Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review
Open: 703-697-6763
Secure: 912-0269
SIPR: Daniel.j.chykirda.civ@mail.smil.mil
JWICS: Daniel.chykirda@osdj.ic.gov
Comments - Caution-Caution-Caution-https://protect2.fireeye.com/url?k=09c6f19b-55dfa708-09c6dfcc-0cc47a335a36-bca90642d86083d5&u=Caution-https://ice.disa.mil/index.cfm?fsa=card&sp=139133&s=110&dep=*DoD

-----Original Message-----

From: Galbreath, Nathan W (Nate) SES DODHRA SAPRO (US)
Sent: Tuesday, March 6, 2018 5:20 PM
To: Chykirda, Daniel J CIV WHS ESD (US) <daniel.j.chykirda.civ@mail.mil>; Wetzel, Eric S CIV OSD OUSD P-R (US) <eric.s.wetzel.civ@mail.mil>
Cc: Mohondro, Kelly C CIV OSD OUSD P-R (US) <kelly.c.mohondro.civ@mail.mil>; Morral, Andrew R CTR (US) <morral@rand.org>
Subject: RE: Status Checks (UNCLASSIFIED)

Daniel,

I did not see any legal objections to 18-S-0540, "Development of a Short Form Measure of Sexual Harassment Risk in the Military"

If there were any, would you please forward to me -- or did that one get cleared for release? I've cc'd Dr. Morral from RAND on this for his situational awareness.

VR
N

Nate Galbreath, PhD, MFS
Deputy Director
DoD Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office
O: 571-372-2636
C: 703-409-7253
Email: nathan.w.galbreath.civ@mail.mil

From: Chykirda, Daniel J CIV WHS ESD (US)
Sent: Friday, February 23, 2018 12:27
To: Wetzel, Eric S CIV OSD OUSD P-R (US)
Cc: Mohondro, Kelly C CIV OSD OUSD P-R (US); Galbreath, Nathan W (Nate) SES DODHRA SAPRO (US)
Subject: RE: Status Checks (UNCLASSIFIED)

Eric,

Here are the case numbers and associated titles:

18-S-0540, "Development of a Short Form Measure of Sexual Harassment Risk in the Military"
18-S-0556, "Needs of Male Sexual Assault Victims"

18-S-0564 "Sexual Assault & Sexual Harassment in the US Military. Column 5: Installation & Command level Risk of Sexual Assault & Sexual Harassment"

I have received the last OGC review back and before I sent the comments over I wanted to make sure that SAPRO had received all the comments P&R may have had and to get a copy for our case files.

v/r,

Dan

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Chykirda, Daniel J CIV WHS ESD (US)

From: Thomas, Lisa CIV USARMY HQDA OCPA (US)
Sent: Monday, March 11, 2019 3:31 PM
To: Chykirda, Daniel J CIV WHS ESD (US); Wilson, Ruby C CIV USARMY HQDA DCS G-3-5-7 (USA)
Cc: Sturgis, George R (Frosty) JR CIV WHS ESD (USA); Morse, Cameron R CIV WHS ESD (US)
Subject: RE: Security Review 18-S-0995/1

Daniel,

I will have to find out who is taking Ms. Wilson's place.

v/r,

Lisa Thomas
Office of the Chief of Public Affairs (OCPA)
Government Information Specialist
1500 Army Pentagon
Room 1E487
Office: (703) 693-6578
Email: lisa.thomas.civ@mail.mil
SIPR Email: lisa.thomas16.civ@mail.smil.mil

-----Original Message-----

From: Chykirda, Daniel J CIV WHS ESD (US) <daniel.j.chykirda.civ@mail.mil>
Sent: Monday, March 11, 2019 3:05 PM
To: Wilson, Ruby C CIV USARMY HQDA DCS G-3-5-7 (USA) <ruby.c.wilson7.civ@mail.mil>
Cc: Sturgis, George R (Frosty) JR CIV WHS ESD (USA) <george.r.sturgis.civ@mail.mil>; Morse, Cameron R CIV WHS ESD (US) <cameron.r.morse.civ@mail.mil>; Thomas, Lisa CIV USARMY HQDA OCPA (US) <lisa.thomas16.civ@mail.mil>
Subject: RE: Security Review 18-S-0995/1

I am checking on this appeal, RAND has pinged us again. I need your office's response to close this out. Thank you for your assistance.

v/r,

Dan

Daniel Chykirda
Security Review Specialist
Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review
Open: 703-697-6763
Secure: 912-0269
SIPR: Daniel.j.chykirda.civ@mail.smil.mil
JWICS: Daniel.chykirda@osdj.ic.gov
Comments - https://ice.disa.mil/index.cfm?fsa=card&sp=139133&s=110&dep=*DoD

-----Original Message-----

From: Chykirda, Daniel J CIV WHS ESD (US)

Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2019 9:55 AM

To: Wilson, Ruby C CIV USARMY HQDA DCS G-3-5-7 (USA) <ruby.c.wilson7.civ@mail.mil>

Cc: Sturgis, George R (Frosty) JR CIV WHS ESD (USA) <george.r.sturgis.civ@mail.mil>; Morse, Cameron R CIV WHS ESD (US) <cameron.r.morse.civ@mail.mil>; Thomas, Lisa CIV USARMY HQDA OCPA (US) <lisa.thomas16.civ@mail.mil>

Subject: Security Review 18-S-0995/1

Ruby,

I am checking on the security review appeal 18-S-0995/1, entitled "Throughput Based Analysis of Army Active/Reserve Component Mix for Major Contingency Surge Operations." I know you talked to Lisa about this case recently, but RAND has been asking about it and it was tasked out 6 months ago. Can you please provide an estimated time of completion for this appeal. Thank you for your assistance

v/r,

Dan

Daniel Chykirda

Security Review Specialist

Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review

Open: 703-697-6763

Secure: 912-0269

SIPR: Daniel.j.chykirda.civ@mail.mil

JWICS: Daniel.chykirda@osdj.ic.gov

Comments - https://ice.disa.mil/index.cfm?fsa=card&sp=139133&s=110&dep=*DoD

Chykirda, Daniel J CIV WHS ESD (US)

From: Thomas, Lisa CIV USARMY HQDA OCPA (US)
Sent: Tuesday, January 22, 2019 8:40 AM
To: Chykirda, Daniel J CIV WHS ESD (US)
Subject: RE: 18-S-0995/1
Signed By: lisa.thomas16.civ@mail.mil

Hi Daniel,

I just sent her an email and left a voice mail message.

v/r,

Lisa

-----Original Message-----

From: Chykirda, Daniel J CIV WHS ESD (US) <daniel.j.chykirda.civ@mail.mil>
Sent: Friday, January 18, 2019 2:02 PM
To: Thomas, Lisa CIV USARMY HQDA OCPA (US) <lisa.thomas16.civ@mail.mil>
Subject: 18-S-0995/1

Lisa,

We had a meeting with RAND this week and they inquired on the appeal. Thanks!

v/r,

Dan

Daniel Chykirda
Security Review Specialist
Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review
Open: 703-697-6763
Secure: 912-0269
SIPR: Daniel.j.chykirda.civ@mail.smil.mil
JWICS: Daniel.chykirda@osdj.ic.gov
Comments - https://ice.disa.mil/index.cfm?fsa=card&sp=139133&s=110&dep=*DoD



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE OFFICE OF PREPUBLICATION AND SECURITY REVIEW
1155 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1155

April 4, 2019
Ref: 18-S-0995/1

Mr. Pete Ledwich
RAND Corporation
1200 South Hayes Street
Arlington, VA 22202-5050

Dear Mr. Ledwich:

This is in response to your August 22, 2018, correspondence appealing the public release clearance denial for the RAND report:

- *Throughput Based Analysis of Army Active/Reserve Component Mix for Major Contingency Surge Operations*

Besides this office the report was sent to the Department of the Army's Office of the Chief of Public Affairs for appellate review. After careful assessment the Department of the Army concluded that the report contains no classified information and is suitable for public release. The report is **cleared** for public release.

Attached is a cleared copy of the cover page for this report. Please direct any questions regarding this case to Mr. Daniel Chykirda, Security Review Specialist, at 703-697-6763 or by email at daniel.j.chykirda.civ@mail.mil.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "George R. Sturgis Jr.".

George R. Sturgis Jr.
Chief

Attachments:
As stated

NOT CLEARED FOR OPEN PUBLICATION. DO NOT CIRCULATE OR QUOTE.

Research Report

A THROUGHPUT-BASED ANALYSIS OF ARMY ACTIVE COMPONENT/RESERVE COMPONENT MIX FOR MAJOR CONTINGENCY SURGE OPERATIONS

Michael Linick, Igor Mikolic-Torreira, Katharina Best, Alexander Stephenson, Jeremy Eckhause, Isaac Baruffi, Christopher Carson, Eric Duckworth, Melissa Bauman

RAND National Defense Research Institute

CLEARED
For Open Publication

Apr 09, 2019

Department of Defense
OFFICE OF PREPUBLICATION AND SECURITY REVIEW

RR-1516-OSD

February 2017

Prepared for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs

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18-S-0995

**Defense Office of
Prepublication & Security
Review**

Case Number: 18-S-0995/1 Source: RAND - LINDA BARRON
Subject: THROUGHPUT BASED ANALYSIS OF ARMY ACTIVE COMPONENT RESERVE COMPONENT MIX FOR MAJOR
CONTINGENCY SURGE OPERATIONS
Purpose: PUBLIC RELEASE Event Date: Pages: 89
Requester: Linck, Michael Document Type: PAPER
Date Received: 08/23/2018 Classification: Secret Typist: (b)(6)
Suspense Date: 09/20/2018 Date Completed:
Reviewer's Worksheet: Action Officer: DCHYKIRDA

Notes:

Comments: (continue on reverse side if necessary)

OSR Action

Recommended Action

- ☐ Cleared
☐ Cleared as Amended
☐ Not Cleared
☐ See Memo Attached

Final Action

- ☒ Cleared
☐ Cleared as Amended
☐ Not Cleared
☐ See Memo Attached

Initials/Date _____

Initials/Date CRGM 4/9/2019

Case should be indexed under the following keywords: _____

(b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
Department of Defense
Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review
Rm. 2A534 Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-1155

August 27th, 2018

ATT: Director of Administration, Office of the Chief Management Officer

RE: APPEAL - CLEARED AS AMENDED – DoD Review of Manuscript: (b)(4)
Author: (b)(6), manuscript submitted for review on February 9, 2018

Dear Sir or Madam,

I am appealing the DOPSR redactions to my manuscript, (b)(4), Ref: 18-S-0894, Mr. Walker decision memorandum dated: July 26, 2018.

Your office has confirmed the service departments who have equities in the material covered in the work, and therefore reviewed the manuscript are the Department of the Navy (USN) and the Department of the Air Force (USAF). The USN responded with no concerns (see Attachment 1). The USAF is requiring redactions of five entire paragraphs, one modified definition found in the unclassified Multi-Service Brevity Codes, NTTP 60-2.1 (found online), and parts of two additional passages. I was not provided the basis for the redactions, so my response is based on my best guess of the reviewer's logic for requiring the redactions.

Only one of the USAF required redactions concerns a specific Air Force equity, my brief description of the F-22 Raptor, which is drawn from the publicly released USAF fact sheet on the Raptor and the Northrop-Grumman website and therefore should not be required to be redacted. USAF Fact Sheets are on the USAF public website at <https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/>. Another redaction concerns a fictional weapons build-up in Iran. A third briefly describes Russian missile employment doctrine. The remaining redactions concern rudimentary fighter tactics employed by both services and our allies – counter-radar and counter-missile defense, employment of chaff and flares, transmission authentication, and a baffling redaction concerning fighters attacking from different axes. These rudimentary fighter aircraft tactics are published in the public domain, many fictional novels, and other media such as motion pictures. Additionally, for decades, the daily sorties (training missions) over Europe, Asia, Australia, Africa, and North and South America practice these basic fighter aircraft maneuvers. Anyone from our adversaries to aircraft aficionados can listen to our radio transmissions and deduce exactly what is taking place.

All of the employment chapters of my book concern Naval operations, and therefore USN equities. The USN has carefully reviewed the employment chapters and had no concerns. Therefore, it is my strong assertion that the USN view of the releasability of the information should take precedence over the USAF's strict and out of context review.

Attachment 2 is a passage-by-passage explanation of why the USAF-requested redactions should be overturned. The information is readily available on the Internet and other public domain print media. I am making two minor adjustments to my manuscript for which I request approval.

Due to the specific nature of the required redactions, I request the adjudication of my appeal be performed by a subject matter expert, namely a rated officer with fighter experience. Additionally, if material specific to the Department of the Navy is still required to be redacted by the USAF, I request the redactions be coordinated with the USN.

I am on a tight timeline for completion of my book. Please complete your review no later than 15 October. I also request that if you continue to require me to redact material, you provide me the reason why, but also redact narrowly as possible. Instead of redacting entire paragraphs, redact words or sentences, so I can write around the redactions.

Thank you for your consideration.

(b)(6)













cc Mr. Daniel Russ, esq.

2 Attachments

1. Email from Mr. Samuel Gotti
2. Analysis of USAF requested redactions

Attachment 1 – 4/2/2018 Email from Mr. Gotti

Compose          

View ▾


◀ Back


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RE: [Non-DoD Source] Re: Case # 18-S-0894 – (b)(4) (UNCLASSIFIED)



 Gotti, Samuel CIV OSD OSD (US) <samuel.gotti@osd.mil>

4/2/2018 10:19 AM 

To (b)(6)

Quick reply all Reply Forward Delete 

✱  1 attachment View Open in browser Download

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

No concerns from Navy.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, April 2, 2018 1:08 PM
To: Gotti, Samuel CIV OSD OSD (US) <samuel.gotti@osd.mil>
Subject: Re: [Non-DoD Source] Re: Case # 18-S-0894 – (b)(4) (UNCLASSIFIED)

One quick question... I'm assuming USN completed their review. Did they indicate any concerns I can start working on to correct?

Sent from my iPhone

Attachment 2 – Analysis of Required Redactions

Passage 1, Manuscript page 151 (Fictional Iranian Weapons Modernization):

This passage is made up and has no basis whatsoever in fact. (b)(4) takes place a few years in the future. The story plays out against an entirely fictional scenario of a conflict against Iran. Frankly, the intent of this passage is to create dramatic tension. My logic was that economic sanctions had crippled Iran. Sanctions were lifted as a result of the nuclear deal negotiated by the Obama administration. Political Scientists and news media pundits for many years, have confirmed, when authoritarian nations perceive themselves to be isolated or threatened, they seek a source of income, and embark on a program of weapons modernization. In my fictional account, this is Iran's response. The redacted passage follows.

(b)(4)



When determining specifically which fighters to populate this imaginary scenario, I went to Wikipedia and searched for countries to which Russia and China have exported military aircraft. Additionally, a search on Internet search engines such as Google identify multiple public domain articles describing the export of military aircraft.

However, wanting to be on safe ground with respect to sensitive information, since Wikipedia is recognized as a notoriously unreliable source, I started my search on other countries flying the SU-30 version of the Flanker there. I cross-checked Wikipedia with multiple Internet based media sources asserting the export of Russian manufactured jets. The SU-30 has been exported to numerous Asian and African countries, and the Iranian government has expressed interest in obtaining Russian military aircraft and helicopters for decades. Although fiction, it is no great stretch to assume it could be exported to Iran as well. Looking up Chinese fighter aircraft, I picked the J-10 as being an in-service aircraft that could conceivably be exported. It's export to Iran is pure fiction. The geopolitics associated with the export and import of all types of military armament is well known, and is recognized not just as big business but as a distinct industry. In fact, the "arms race" is a common theme for military novels

The reference to fitting SU-30s with AESA radars came from the following article: "Phazotron Zhuk AE: Assessing Russia's First AESA." It can be found at <http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Zhuk-AE-Analysis.html>. Again, in trying to build a

capable Iranian Air Force, it only seemed logical to me that the fighters procured would be fitted with the latest avionics. If the fictional upgrade of the SU-30's radar system is the basis for redaction, the sheer amount of information in the public domain should be considered.

With respect to missiles, again a simple Google search reveals the types of air-to-air missiles employed by Russian air forces and exported to numerous countries around the world. I make no mention of which variants of the missile my fictional Iran is using, nor any of their capabilities. I merely make the statement, "latest version of". There should be nothing sensitive in that verbiage. Again, if the basis for redaction is making such a broad statement, the amount of public domain information supports no redaction.

The closing sentence is, of course, hyperbole and intended strictly for dramatic effect.

Again, I must emphasize this entire passage is made up and is unsupported by news stories or official information. There is no logical reason to require it to be redacted.

Passage 2, Manuscript pages 153 -154 (Counter-Radar Tactics):

(b)(4)



The above is basic radar theory. There is nothing sensitive about it. There are many sources that detail how a pulse doppler radar works. A simplified version comes from the National Weather Service, <https://www.weather.gov/jetstream/how>.

By their design, Doppler radar systems can provide information regarding the movement of targets as well as their position. When the WSR-88D transmits pulses of radio waves, the system keeps track of the phase (shape, position, and form) of those pulses.

By measuring the shift (or change) in phase between a transmitted pulse and a received echo, the target's movement directly toward or away from the radar is calculated. This then provides a velocity along the direction the radar is pointing,

called radial velocity. A positive phase shift implies motion toward the radar and a negative shift indicates motion away from the radar.

Furthermore, a walk-through of the National Air and Space Museums "Time and Navigation (The Untold Story of Getting from Here and There)" exhibit provides an explanation of the Doppler radar, see <https://airandspace.si.edu/exhibitions/time-and-navigation>.

As mentioned in the USAF-redacted passage, the ground reflects radar and will always display as a return on a fighter radar (or weather radar for that matter) unless filtered out. A filter or Doppler notch is placed into the system so the pilot is not having to deal with the radar signal from the ground. The return of an airplane flying within the radar's notch, close to the relative speed of the ground, ie. perpendicular to the fighter's flight path, will be filtered out by the radar processor.

Dan Hampton states some of this on pages 53 and 54 of his book *Viper Pilot* (The author's note states it has been reviewed by the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force and cleared for publication).

Additionally, The F-15 unclassified weapons manual (TO 1-F-15C-34-1, NONNUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY MANUAL, available at <http://www.avialogs.com/viewer/avialogs-documentviewer.php?id=3701>) addresses Doppler detection of velocity and filters for clutter reduction on pages 1-6 and 1-7.

Below are some other internet sources that discuss the Doppler notch and the notch maneuver.

<http://www.fighterpilotuniversity.com/music-and-theater/cool-stuff/fighter-brevity/>

NOTCH (Direction) - All-aspect missile defensive maneuver to place threat radar/missile near the beam.

http://www.answers.com/Q/What_is_a_notch_maneuver

Notch maneuver is when an aircraft being tracked by a pulse Doppler radar (whether ground or air intercept radar from an adversary aircraft) flies perpendicular to the radar to escape detection and tracking. Since Doppler radars use Doppler shift to determine its target's velocity and whether it's flying away or inbound, when the targeted aircraft flies perpendicular relative to the radar, it loses its Doppler shift, thus, the radar ignores it thinking that it's a stationary target such as mountains and etc.

<https://www.strategypage.com/militaryforums/6-30438-page1.aspx#startofcomments>

One of the other tactics in the BVR is notching and the variety of maneuvers designed to make a doppler radar believe you are the ground. By rapidly pulling into a course roughly perpendicular to the target's, the "notch gate"

http://www.simhq.com/air/air_099d.html (highlights mine)

Let's say we have detected and are prosecuting a bogey that has been confirmed to be hostile. The bandit has us locked and your radar warning is indicating a shot has been taken. You're still 12-15 seconds away from an Rmax (max range) shot on the HUD, what do you do? At this stage you don't have to give up and run. The first tactic to try is the "beaming maneuver". Simply stated, you do a high G 90 degree turn left or right to try and destroy the Doppler shift for his radar. Most likely this will break lock and the missile won't be able to engage you. The radar needs to "see" the high closure or Doppler shift values on the returned energy to maintain a lock on your jet. Be aware that some versions of the later Russian missiles, particularly the R-77 (AA-12) will have an active capability so you're not necessarily out of the woods.

The beam maneuver will also work against the missile itself once its gone active. This beam maneuver, also termed "using the notch" (for the Doppler notch) should be held for a short period of time and then you reevaluate what your radar warning is telling you. If missiles are still flying at you, you turn to put the missile/bandit at your six at the same time unloading the aircraft and heading for the deck at as fast as the jet can go! If you do this outside of 10-12 miles, you will likely defeat the missile. Hopefully he won't run you down or you have some place to go which is "safer".

If the beam maneuver works we pitch back to reacquire and hopefully have evened up the missile range problem as the bandit now is looking at a shot but so are you. At this point if you can't build enough SA to continue, head towards safer airspace as fast as possible with your head on a swivel and good mutual support.

<http://www.f-16.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=10899> (highlights mine)

Nothing classified about the "beam maneuver".

If other dude has a pulse doppler radar with a minimum velocity "gate" it's effective.

For example, if fast-moving tgts are on the ground, or are helo's you don't wanna see, then some radars would not present them on the "black" screen. The original Viper settings were something like 60 knots. Hence we would pick up speeding demons on the freeways or highways. This speed was increased for the European Vipers once they were in Germany due to the autobahn traffic. Might even have been selectable.

So what you do is turn sharply before the other guys launches and kill your relative velocity so as to get under his velocity "gate". You disappear from his display. You "beam" him, up or sideways.

Another post from the same thread (highlights mine):

To add to what Gums said, the reason for the velocity gate or "notch" is to keep ground clutter off the screen. While hurt doesn't move, cars do and it's amazing what wind through trees can do to clutter up a Doppler radar (i.e. something with relative motion directly to or away from the radar). 60 kts was chosen because it hid cars. Anything less than that is referred to as "in the Doppler notch". Like he said, once Vipers hit Germany and encountered the Autobahn, the notch was increased to 110 or so knots, and it was selectable. Beaming simply refers to turning sideways (or vertical) so that your speed relative to the other guy was inside his notch...think crossing the "T" with the radar at the base and your flight path across the top.

I would also refer you to the definition of Notch(ing) in Brevity Code, "Directive/informative call that an aircraft is in a defensive position and maneuvering with reference to an air-to-air threat." This clearly identifies the Notch maneuver as something the pilot does defensively against an air-to-air threat. All that is omitted is the mechanics of the maneuver and what it is intended to accomplish. That is provided by other sources above.

There is another problem with the redactions to this passage. You are also requesting I redact the following:

(b)(4)
[REDACTED]

There is nothing classified or sensitive about the use of chaff. It has been around since WWII and its sole purpose is to confuse enemy radar systems. If a pilot is being tracked by an enemy radar, of course he (or she) is going to use it in combination with maneuvering to defeat the radar. I provide the following on the use and purpose of chaff from NAVY TRAINING SYSTEM PLAN FOR THE AIRBORNE EXPENDABLE COUNTERMEASURES, N78-NTSP-A-50-0109/A OCTOBER 2001.

Airborne Expendable Countermeasures are electronic warfare devices used for preemptive or terminal protection of aircraft from Radio Frequency (RF) or Infrared (IR) guided missile attack. Countermeasures are grouped into threat categories of RF passive, RF active, or IR, and include decoy flares, chaff, and expendable RF jamming devices. Decoy flares act as decoys for diverting heat seeking missiles, chaff provides a passive jamming action against enemy radar, and expendable jamming devices transmit RF power to counter airborne and land-based semi-active radar guided missiles. Countermeasure devices are deployed from fixed or rotary wing aircraft equipped with countermeasure dispensers.

(8) RR-184/AL Chaff Cartridge (Tactical). The RR-184/AL Chaff Cartridge (Tactical) is a passive countermeasure that provides self protection against RF search and track radars, and RF guided missiles and anti-aircraft batteries.

"Naked" and "hot" are both terms contained in brevity code. The fact that the wingman is not being targeted by enemy radar and is turning toward the threat is open source.

The information contained in my paragraph above is readily available through multiple sources and should not be redacted.

I respectfully emphasize (again) that the passages relating to the performance of a U.S. fighter jet by reviewed by a rated officer (pilot or navigator). If a rated officer accomplished the review and requires the redaction of entire passages (with information available in the public domain), a justification should be provided.

Passage 3. Manuscript page 176 (Missile Defense and Use of Chaff and Flares):

I am including the entire passage for context. Strike-through sentences highlighted in yellow are those DOPSR are requesting to be redacted.

(b)(4)



The entire purpose of chaff and flares is to confuse enemy radars and missiles. If Kate has an air-to-air missile shot at her, of course she is going to use them. Open source military documents (listed in the above section) explain their purpose.

Please refer to Dan Hampton's book, *Viper Pilot*. Chapters 3, "The Elephant," and 7, "Shock and Awe," both chapters give a description of operating in a SAM environment. There are multiple references to deploying chaff and flares. There are also descriptions of counter-missile maneuvering. Granted, he is writing about reactions to surface to air missiles, but the same principles apply in an air-to-air environment. Additionally, there is nothing classified or sensitive about jettisoning tanks or turning to an egress heading.

The following passage found at <http://ausairpower.net/TE-Evading-Missiles.html> describes missile defense. The highlights are mine.

The initial defensive manoeuvre should be a hard break turn while deploying flares, chaff and throttling back. This will increase the LOS rate relative to the incoming missile which can affect tracking, while also changing aspect which introduces jitter and rotates the tailpipe away from a six o'clock threat. Attaining beam aspect relative to the missile can be most effective when dealing with Doppler radar guided missiles at lower altitudes, as the resulting rapid drop in Doppler can and often does result in lock being broken. Fuse performance may also be degraded.

Turning to beam aspect should allow visual acquisition and tracking of the incoming missile, particularly if fired from six o'clock. It is important that tactical aircraft maintain high airspeed over hostile territory, preferably above v_c (v_c - corner speed = minimum speed at which maximum load factor (G) may be attained) to allow the application of maximum G when under attack. A good rule of thumb quoted [1] is that a missile must pull at least five times the G -load of its target for a successful interception, therefore an aircraft maximises its chances of survival by maintaining a high energy state.

Good thrust/weight ratio and turn rate are not lost under these circumstances, getting caught at low airspeeds has often proved to be fatal. The direction of the break turn is dependent upon the aspect from which the missile is approaching, the objective always being to attain beam aspect relative to the missile. Breaking downward can force a radar guided missile to look down into clutter, while breaking into the sun or clouds can saturate a heat seeker's detector with background infra-red.

If beam aspect is attained before the missile closes, it may not be advantageous to continue the turn and the best alternative can be an out-of-plane turn which maintains beam aspect and a high LOS rate while also maximising the rate at which the aircraft's aspect relative to the missile changes. If the threat is an AAM launched at substantial range and acquired visually at an early stage, a useful tactic may be to unload and dive away from the missile at full throttle to outrun it or outlast its engine. Visual contact should be maintained to allow a break turn if the missile can keep up.

If there is concern with characterizing the AIM-120 as a fire and forget weapon, I offer the following from the USAF fact sheet on the missile (highlight mine):

AMRAAM is a follow-on to the AIM-7 Sparrow missile series. The missile is faster, smaller and lighter, and has improved capabilities against low-altitude targets. It incorporates active radar with an inertial reference unit and micro-computer system, which makes the missile less dependent upon the fire-control system of the aircraft. Once the missile closes on a target, its active radar guides it to intercept. This enables the pilot to aim and fire several missiles simultaneously at multiple targets. The pilot may then perform evasive maneuvers while the missiles guide themselves to their targets.

I propose a single revision to my original paragraphs. Green highlight indicates the change. The other redactions are spurious and the original text should be allowed to stand.

(b)(1)



Passage 4, Manuscript page 187 (Description of the F-22 Raptor):

(b)(4)



All information in this passage can be found on Northrop-Grumman's website and on the USAF public website and should not be required to be redacted.

Regarding the AN/APG-77 radar, the following is from the Northrop-Grumman website, <http://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/ANAPG80AESA Radar/Documents/AESA.pdf> (Highlight mine).

AN/APG-77 Radar

This radar provides an unprecedented capability in air-to-air combat, allowing the pilot to track and shoot at multiple threat aircraft before the adversary's radar detects the F-22. Solid-state technology and elimination of mechanical moving parts enables the APG-77 to leap ahead of current standards for system reliability and field sustainability.

- *Initial operational capability since January 2006*
- *High reliability and low sustainment costs for the best value*
- *More than 180 systems in full rate production*

My opening sentence, "The Raptor's AN/APG-77 radar is capable of tracking and firing against multiple targets," merely restates the highlighted statement from the manufacturer's website.

The following passage is also from Northrop-Grumman's website, <http://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/ANAPG77AESARadar/Pages/default.aspx> (highlight mine).

Northrop Grumman is responsible for the overall design of the AN/APG-77 radar system, including the control and signal processing software. Northrop Grumman also has responsibility for radar systems integration and test activities. The main component of the radar sensor is a highly reliable Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA), which provides the rapid beam agility, low radar cross section and target detection capability that enables the air dominance fighter to achieve "first look, first kill" capability. The system exhibits a very low radar cross section, supporting the F-22's stealthy design.

The aircraft manufacturer publicly acknowledges the low radar cross section of the AN/APG-77 radar. I am merely restating this fact with my statement, (b)(4)

Regarding the F-22 itself, the following passages are quoted directly from the USAF fact sheet on the F-22, <https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104506/f-22-raptor/>.

The F-22 Raptor is the Air Force's newest fighter aircraft. Its combination of stealth, supercruise, maneuverability, and integrated avionics, coupled with improved supportability, represents an exponential leap in warfighting capabilities. The Raptor performs both air-to-air and air-to-ground missions allowing full realization of operational concepts vital to the 21st century Air Force.

A combination of sensor capability, integrated avionics, situational awareness, and weapons provides first-kill opportunity against threats. The F-22 possesses a sophisticated sensor suite allowing the pilot to track, identify, shoot and kill air-to-air threats before being detected. Significant advances in cockpit design and sensor fusion improve the pilot's situational awareness. In the air-to-air configuration the Raptor carries six AIM-120 AMRAAMs and two AIM-9 Sidewinders.

The F-22's characteristics provide a synergistic effect ensuring F-22A lethality against all advanced air threats. The combination of stealth, integrated avionics and supercruise drastically shrinks surface-to-air missile engagement envelopes and minimizes enemy capabilities to track and engage the F-22. The combination of

reduced observability and supercruise accentuates the advantage of surprise in a tactical environment.

The USAF acknowledges the stealth capabilities of the F-22. Stealth means that the aircraft contains low-observable design and materials which means the aircraft is hard to detect by enemy radars. My statement that the F-22 is theoretically invisible to enemy radars is restating this fact in a way to increase dramatic effect. My sentence, "(b)(4)" is just restating the USAF statement, "*The F-22 possesses a sophisticated sensor suite allowing the pilot to track, identify, shoot and kill air-to-air threats before being detected.*"

Although not directly stated, the logical conclusion that can be drawn from the USAF article is that the radar is also low-observable.

My closing sentence, "(b)(4)" is hyperbole intended for dramatic effect.

Passage 5. Manuscript page 188 (Russian Missile-Firing Doctrine):

(b)(4)

The following is from an article entitled "The Russian Philosophy of Beyond Visual Range Air Combat" which can be found at <https://www.ausaipower.net/APA-Rus-BVR-AAM.html> (highlights mine).

The Russian paradigm of BVR combat has its origins in the Cold War period, when Soviet operational analysis indicated that the low kill probability of missile seekers and airframes, especially if degraded by countermeasures, would be a major impediment to success. By the 1970s the standard Soviet technique in a BVR missile launch was to salvo two rounds, a semi-active radar homing weapon and a heatseeking weapon. To this effect some Soviet fighters even included a weapons select mode which automatically sequenced the launch of two rounds for optimal separation.

A question often asked is why are Sukhoi Flanker variants equipped to carry between eight and twelve BVR missiles? The answer is a simple one - so they can fire more than one three or four round BVR missile salvo during the opening phases of an engagement. In this fashion the aircraft being targeted has a difficult problem as it must jam, decoy and/or outmanoeuvre three or four tightly spaced inbound missiles. Even if we assume a mediocre per round kill probability of 30 percent, a four round salvo still exceeds a total kill probability of 75 percent.

My statement above draws from the highlighted sentences in these two paragraphs and should not be redacted. This information is available in the public domain.

Passage 6, Manuscript page 188 (Maneuvers in a threat environment):

Strike-throughs highlighted in yellow are DOPSR requested redactions.

(b)(4)



Please see my rebuttal to Passage 2 concerning the explanation of the notch and using it for defensive purposes. I am offering no explanation of "notch" or "hot" in this passage. Both terms are explained in the unclassified Brevity Code and should not be required to be redacted.

Passage 7, Manuscript page 199 (Transmission Authentication):

(b)(4)



The authentication procedure is clearly described at GlobalSecurity.org,
<https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/acrp/ss0002/le3.htm>.

8. Challenge and Reply.

Whenever possible, you should use challenge and reply authentication as it can validate both the transmitting and receiving stations. Figure 3-1 is a reproduction of the challenge and reply and transmission authentication tables. Refer to this figure in the following discussion of authentication procedures. When two stations establish radio contact, the station being called should always issue the first challenge. This prevents an enemy from entering your net just to get a valid authentication to use in another net. When the called station has challenged and the calling station has replied, the calling station should challenge in order to also validate the called station. The following paragraphs detail the challenge and reply process. For illustration purposes, assume that station M21 is calling station M35.

M21 issues the call "Mike tree fife, this is mike too wun, over." This establishes the identities of both the calling and the called stations.

M35 must now issue an authentication challenge. Looking at the challenge and reply system, he chooses a letter from the far left column. This is the line indicator column. He then chooses another letter from the row indicated by the first letter he chose. These two letters make up the challenge. Thus, his transmission would be "Mike too wun, this is mike tree fife, authenticate delta golf, over." M35 has chosen delta and golf as his two letters to challenge.

M21 must now reply to the challenge and issue a challenge of his own. To reply, he must have the same table as M35. He looks up the letter Delta in the left-hand column. He then looks up the letter Golf in Delta's row (row 4 in this case). His reply should be the letter directly beneath Golf on the table. In this case it would be Bravo. He then chooses two different letters to issue as a counter challenge to M35. His transmission should be "Mike tree fife, this is mike too wun, I authenticate bravo, authenticate yankee victor, over."

M35 must now respond to M21's challenge. He looks up yankee on his authentication table, and then finds victor in yankee's row. Since yankee is the last row on the table he gets the reply from the first row on the table as if it wrapped around. His reply letter, then, is tango, and his transmission is "Mike too wun, this is mike tree fife, I authenticate tango, over." At this point, both stations have authenticated and they may continue to communicate and pass whatever traffic they need to pass.

The above passage also contains an image of a notional authentication tables. Additionally, a simple Google search reveals several images of authentication tables.

This passage should not be required to be redacted, but I am proposing a single modification, highlighted in green, to bring the passage into conformance with the procedure outlined above.

(b)(4)



Passage 8, Manuscript page 201 (Surface-to-Air Missile Engagement):

(b)(4)



Attacking from separate axes is a rudimentary battle tactic that has been used by individuals and armies since cavemen first began bashing each other over the head with clubs. It complicates the problem of the defender. There's nothing classified or sensitive

about it. In fact, it is described in Multi-Service Brevity Codes under the definition of Bracket – "Directive call to maneuver to a position on opposite sides, either laterally or vertically from the target," or Pince – "Threat maneuvering for a bracket attack."

"Break" is described in Brevity Code as a directive call to perform an immediate maximum performance 180-degree turn (or as directed) in the indicated direction.

This passage should not be required to be redacted.

Passage 9, Manuscript page 240 (Modified Brevity Code Definition):

(b)(4)



For reasons spelled out above, this modified Brevity Code definition should not be redacted.

Defense Office of Prepublication & Security Review

Case Number: 18-S-0894/1 Source: (b)(6)

Subject: (b)(4)

Purpose: PUBLIC RELEASE Event Date: Pages: 246

Requester: (b)(6) Document Type: BOOK

Date Received: 08/28/2018 Classification: Unclassified Typist: mchalek

Suspense Date: 10/26/2018 Date Completed: 10/01/2018

Reviewer Worksheet: Action Officer: mchalek

Agency Name	Routed Date	Due Date	Action	Remarks
SAF/PA	09/05/2018	10/05/2018	NO OBJECTION	

Notes:

KT: The withholdings are reversed on appeal. DoD approves the new proposed language on pages 176 and 199.

Comments (continue on reverse side if necessary):

CLEARED
For Open Publication

Oct 01, 2018

Department of Defense
OFFICE OF PREPUBLICATION AND SECURITY REVIEW

DOPSR Action

Recommended Action

- ☐ Cleared
- ☐ Cleared with Recommendations
- ☐ Cleared as Amended
- ☐ Not Cleared
- ☐ See Memo Attached

Initials/Date _____

Final Action

- ☒ Cleared
- ☐ Cleared with Recommendations
- ☐ Cleared as Amended
- ☐ Not Cleared
- ☐ See Memo Attached

Initials/Date MCHALE.KELL Digitally signed by
Y.A.12906826 MCHALE.KELLY.A.12506
10 82610
Date: 2018.10.01
16:36:27 -04'00'

Case should be indexed under the following keywords: _____

McHale, Kelly A CIV WHS ESD (US)

From: McHale, Kelly A CIV WHS ESD (US)
Sent: Monday, October 1, 2018 4:31 PM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: DOPSR Appeal 18-S-0894/1
Attachments: 18-S-0984-1 Appeal Response.pdf

(b)(6)

Good afternoon. Attached is DOPSR's final response to your prepublication review appeal. The manuscript is now cleared for public release. If you have any questions about this response, please let me know.

Thank you,

Kelly McHale
Security Review Specialist
Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review
Tel: 703.614.4903
<http://www.esd.whs.mil/DOPSR/>

Comments - https://ice.disa.mil/index.cfm?fsa=card&sp=139133&s=110&dep=*DoD



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE OFFICE OF PREPUBLICATION AND SECURITY REVIEW
1155 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1155

OCT - 1 2018

Ref: 18-S-0894/1

(b)(6)

Dear (b)(6):

This is in response to your August 27, 2018, letter initiating the appeal of the Department of Defense (DoD) review determination of the manuscript titled, (b)(4). The Department of the Air Force and the Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review reviewed the manuscript again and the original determination of clearance with amendments is reversed. The manuscript is **CLEARED** for public release. The DoD also approves the proposed new language on pages 176 and 199.

This approval does not include any photograph, picture, exhibit, caption, or other supplemental material not specifically approved by this office, nor does this approval imply DoD endorsement or factual accuracy of the material.

The first page of the cleared manuscript is enclosed. Please direct any questions regarding this case to Kelly McHale at (703) 614-4903 or at kelly.a.mchale.civ@mail.mil.

Sincerely,

Darrell W. Walker
Chief

Enclosure(s):
As stated

(b)(4)

Final Draft

(b)(6)

Submitted to OSD for
Prepublication Security Review

**CLEARED
For Open Publication**

Oct 01, 2018

**Department of Defense
OFFICE OF PREPUBLICATION AND SECURITY REVIEW**

(b)(6)

**Defense Office of Prepublication & Security
Review**

18-S-0894/1

Coordination Record
SECURITY REVIEW

09/05/2018

To: SAF/PA -

Case Number: 18-S-0894/1

Type Of Document: BOOK

Pages: 246

Classification: Secret

Source: (b)(6)

Event Date:

Purpose: PUBLIC RELEASE

Requester: (b)(6)

Subject: (b)(4)

The attached material is forwarded for review in accordance with the following guidelines. Questions concerning this case should be directed to :
KELLY MCHALE, Room: 2A534, 7036144903, Email: kelly.a.mchale.civ@mail.mil, Unclassified Fax: .

Please advise if reviews required other than: SAF/PA

A reply is requested by: 10/05/2018

COORDINATION OFFICE ACTION

To: Defense Office of Prepublication & Security Review, DOPSR, Room , 2A534, 1155 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-1155

Review by this office in accordance with guidelines below, result in the following recommendation concerning clearance for publication.

Check One:

- ☐ No Objection as Received.
- ☐ Recommended Changes.
- ☐ No Objection Subject to Amendments made by this office (in black pencil). Amendments and rationale (security and policy) are annotated on page numbers listed below.
- ☐ Objection. Amendments to permit publication are impracticable. Reasons stated below.

(Continue on reverse side if necessary)

typed name, title, organization	phone number	date	signature
---------------------------------	--------------	------	-----------

Instructions: It is the policy of the Department of Defense to authorize and encourage the public release of information concerning the Department of Defense consistent with security requirements, and other exemptions to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.

Security: Reviewing agencies should identify information known to be classified within the meaning of Executive Order 13526 (DoD Regulation 5200.1R) or information which in the judgement of the reviewing agency warrants classification. In the latter case, it is requested that reasons for this judgement be given and recommendations made for appropriate classification.

Policy: Material originated with the Department of Defense for public release should, in addition, be reviewed for conflict with established policies and programs of the Department of Defense or those of the national government. If change is necessary, reviewing agencies are requested to recommend acceptable substitute language where practicable, or specify needed change in sufficient detail to permit acceptable revision.

Editorial: Editorial review is not the responsibility of the Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review and reviewing agencies should not make editorial corrections. However, obvious errors of fact should be indicated.

October 1, 2018
Ref: 18-S-0894/1

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

In addition to appealing the redactions, the author also proposed new language on pages 176 and 199. See green highlighted text in appeal letter. I reviewed this language and find no sensitivity. We'll approve this language in addition to reversing the withholdings.



Kelly McHale
Security Review Specialist

McHale, Kelly A CIV WHS ESD (US)

From: SAFFAOSP.Workflow@pentagon.af.mil
Sent: Tuesday, September 25, 2018 4:05 PM
To: McHale, Kelly A CIV WHS ESD (US); WHS Pentagon ESD Mailbox SECREV
Subject: SAF/PA Case Completed: Case Number 2018-0182

SAF/PA has completed the review process for your case on 25 Sep 2018:

Subject: Book - (b)(4) - FOR PUBLIC RELEASE (Book)

Originator Reference Number: 18-S-0894/0 Case Reviewer: Carolyn Oredugba Case Number: 2018-0182 The material was assigned a clearance of NO OBJECTION on 25 Sep 2018. If local policy permits, the Review Manager for your case, Carolyn Oredugba, carolyn.y.oredugba.civ@mail.mil, will prepare a hard copy of the review and will forward it via mail or prepare it for pick up.

McHale, Kelly A CIV WHS ESD (US)

From: Oredugba, Carolyn Y CIV USAF SAF-PA (US)
Sent: Tuesday, September 25, 2018 2:23 PM
To: McHale, Kelly A CIV WHS ESD (US)
Cc: Sumpter, Beverly A CIV USAF SAF-PA (US)
Subject: 18-S-0894.1 - Appeal
Attachments: Scanned from a Xerox Multifunction Printer.pdf
Signed By: carolyn.oredugba@us.af.mil

Kelly

The AF has reviewed subject case, and the AF agrees with the author's appeal.

r/

Carolyn

CAROLYN Y. OREDUGBA

SAF/PA SECURITY AND POLICY REVIEW & SECURITY MANAGER

1690 AIR FORCE PENTAGON (ROOM 4E809)

WASHINGTON, DC 20330-1690

COMM TELE: 703-697-3994/DSN: 227-3994

Defense Office of Prepublication & Security
Review

18-S-0894/1

Coordination Record
SECURITY REVIEW

09/05/2018

To: SAF/PA -

Case Number: 18-S-0894/1

Type Of Document: BOOK

Pages: 246

Classification: Secret

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The attached material is forwarded for review in accordance with the following guidelines. Questions concerning this case should be directed to :
KELLY MCHALE, Room: 2A534, 7036144903, Email: kelly.a.mchale.civ@mail.mil, Unclassified Fax:.

Please advise if reviews required other than: SAF/PA

A reply is requested by: 10/05/2018

COORDINATION OFFICE ACTION

To: Defense Office of Prepublication & Security Review, DOPSR, Room , 2A534, 1155 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-1155.
Review by this office in accordance with guidelines below, result in the following recommendation concerning clearance for publication.

Check One:

- ☒ No Objection as Received. *Appeal Approved*
- ☐ Recommended Changes.
- ☐ No Objection Subject to Amendments made by this office. (in black pencil). Amendments and rationale (security and policy) are annotated on page numbers listed below.
- ☐ Objection. Amendments to permit publication are impracticable. Reasons stated below.

(Continue on reverse side if necessary)

Cadyntredup

25 Sept 18

typed name, title, organization

phone number

date

signature

7036144903

Cadyntredup

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